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In a (generalized) symmetric aggregative game, payoﬀs depend
only on individual strategy and an aggregate of all strategies. Players
behaving as if they were negligible would optimize taking the aggregate
as given. We provide evolutionary and dynamic foundations for such
behavior when the game satisﬁes supermodularity conditions. The
results obtained are also useful to characterize evolutionarily stable
strategies in a ﬁnite population.
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1 Introduction
In perfectly competitive markets, price-taking behavior is often justiﬁed by
assuming that agents are small relative to market size. The implication of
this assumption is that prices are almost insensitive to individual actions.
Hence, even if agents behave strategically, equilibrium behavior corresponds
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1to price-taking optimization as the economy becomes large. The crucial ax-
ioms underlying this non-cooperative foundation of competitive equilibrium
are anonymity—the names of the agents are irrelevant to the market—and
aggregation—individual actions aﬀect market price only through the average
of all actions (Dubey et al. [1980]).
In general, a game where payoﬀs depend only on individual strategies
and an aggregate of all strategies is called a (generalized) aggregative game
(Corch´ on [1994]).1 A prominent example of such games is a Cournot oli-
gopoly, where proﬁts depend exclusively on individual and total output. If,
additionally, payoﬀs do not depend on the names of the agents, the game
is symmetric. Aggregate-taking optimization—the natural generalization of
price-taking behavior—is then still well deﬁned even if agents are not neg-
ligible, although it does not correspond to strategic, rational behavior. An
optimal aggregate-taking strategy (ATS) is one that is individually optimal
given the value of the aggregate when all players adopt it. In an ATS, players
who are not negligible behave as if they were, i. e. they “feel small.”
Schaﬀer [1989] observed that, in a Cournot duopoly, the output cor-
responding to a competitive equilibrium—the output level that maximizes
proﬁts at the market-clearing price—is evolutionarily stable, meaning that
it maximizes relative proﬁts.2 That is, a ﬁrm deviating from the competi-
tive equilibrium will earn lower proﬁts than its competitor after deviation.3
This result was extended to a general oligopoly by Vega-Redondo [1997],
who additionally showed that the competitive equilibrium would be the only
long-run outcome of a learning dynamics based on imitative behavior. The
evolutionary approach, hence, provides foundations for competitive equilib-
rium dispensing with the assumption of negligible agents.
In the present work, we identify the structural characteristics of the
Cournot oligopoly which underly these results. The ﬁrst is the fact that
it is an aggregative game. The second is the strategic substitutability be-
tween individual and total output. Since the incentive to increase individual
output decreases the higher the total output in the market, the Cournot
1Cornes and Hartley [2001] present examples of games which can be viewed as aggrega-
tive games after a suitable transformation of the strategy spaces.
2The concept of evolutionarily stable strategy used here, due to Schaﬀer [1988], refers
to a ﬁnite population and diﬀers from the usual concept in evolutionary game theory for
a continuum population (cf. Section 3).
3The key for the evolutionary success of the competitive ﬁrm is its spiteful behavior.
Quoting Schaﬀer [1989]: “When ﬁrms have market power, the potential for ‘spiteful’
behavior exists. A ﬁrm which forgoes the opportunity to maximise its absolute proﬁt
may still enjoy a selective advantage over its competitors if its ‘spiteful’ deviation from
proﬁt-maximisation harms its competitors more than itself.”
2oligopoly has a submodular structure.4
Indeed, we ﬁnd that the results for the Cournot oligopoly are but an
instance of a general phenomenon. An ATS is evolutionarily stable in any
aggregative game with a submodular structure. This has a natural coun-
terpart in the supermodular case; any evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
corresponds to aggregate-taking optimization.
Possajennikov [2003] already observed a relation between optimal ag-
gregate-taking strategies and evolutionarily stable strategies in aggregative
games. Under diﬀerentiability, he ﬁnds that the ﬁrst-order conditions of
their deﬁning optimization problems are identical. Careful examination of
the second-order conditions allows to determine conditions under which both
concepts coincide. In contrast, our approach relies exclusively on the struc-
ture of the game and provides an intuitive and direct way of relating both
concepts.
In the submodular case, we obtain even stronger results. Any ATS is
weakly globally stable, meaning that it is weakly better in relative terms
independently of the number of opponents behaving diﬀerently. If the game
has a strict ATS, then this is strictly globally stable and the unique ESS.
Furthermore, we show that a strictly globally stable ESS is always the
long-run outcome of a learning dynamics based on imitation and experimen-
tation. This result, which is of independent interest, is proven for arbitrary
(not necessarily aggregative) symmetric games. As a corollary, this will also
hold for any strict ATS of a submodular aggregative game. In short, the dy-
namic stability result of price-taking behavior quoted above generalizes for
aggregate-taking optimization to arbitrary submodular aggregative games.
In our view, these results might be taken to provide an alternative, evo-
lutionary foundation for the perfect competition paradigm. In contrast to
the large-population approach, this foundation does not rely on agents be-
ing negligible. In fact, the evolutionary success of behaving as if they were
negligible is due precisely to the fact that they are not. When an agent
optimizes assuming that she will not aﬀect the aggregate, the latter will ac-
tually change, but in such a way that it is her opponents who will be more
harmed. A key new insight is that this property derives directly from the
supermodular or submodular structure of the game.
These results are also of interest for evolutionary game theory, since they
provide either necessary or suﬃcient conditions to obtain ESS for a class of
aggregative games. In the submodular case, we actually provide shortcuts for
the computation of an ESS and the long-run outcomes of imitative learning
4Amir [1996] and Amir and Lambson [2000] show that certain Cournot oligopolies can
be seen as supermodular through appropriate changes of variable (cf. Section 2.3).
3dynamics. Further, our result on imitative dynamics is, to our knowledge,
the ﬁrst general result on the dynamic properties of ﬁnite-population ESS.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notion of
(generalized) aggregative games and presents examples beyond the Cournot
oligopoly. Section 3 presents the concepts of evolutionary and global stability
for n-player games and particularizes them for aggregative games. Section 4
discusses aggregate-taking behavior. Section 5 presents the results relating
aggregate-taking behavior and evolutionary stability. Section 6 contains the
dynamic results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Generalized symmetric aggregative games
A game is called aggregative if the payoﬀs to any player depend only on
that player’s strategy and the sum of all strategies chosen. If the sum is
replaced by an arbitrary aggregate g, we refer to a generalized aggregative
game (Corch´ on [1994]).
In the present work we will consider symmetric games with a strategy
space S common to all players, assumed to be a subset of a totally ordered
space X. For our purposes it will be enough to let S ⊆ X = R. Further
we will assume the aggregate g to be a symmetric and monotone increasing
function.5 For the sake of expositional simplicity we will drop the qualiﬁers
generalized, symmetric, and monotone, referring to such games simply as
aggregative games.
Deﬁnition 1. A (generalized) symmetric aggregative game with aggregate
g is a tuple Γ ≡ (N,S,π) where N is the number of players, the strategy
set S, common to all players, is a subset of a totally ordered space X, π :
S × X → R is a real-valued function, and g : SN → X is a symmetric and
monotone increasing function, such that individual payoﬀ functions are given
by πi(s) ≡ π(si,g(s)) for all s = (s1,...,sN) ∈ SN and i = 1,...,N.
2.1 Families of aggregative games
Existence of a monotone aggregate function is the only requirement for a
game to be representable as an aggregative game. Hence, this class of games
may be rather large. Actually, in the examples we consider the aggregate is
a functional form that can be extended to any number of players as captured
by the following deﬁnition.
5The analysis could be analogously performed for the case of decreasing aggregates.
4Deﬁnition 2. A family of symmetric aggregative games is a collection of
games {Γn}∞
n=1 where Γn ≡ (n,S,π) is a (generalized) symmetric aggregative
game with aggregate gn such that g1(s) = s for all s ∈ S and there exists a
function g : X × S → X such that
g
n+1(s1,...,sn,sn+1) = g (g
n(s1,...,sn),sn+1) (1)
for all s1,...,sn+1 ∈ S, and all n ≥ 1.
Note that the construction of an aggregate in Deﬁnition 2 follows an in-
ductive scheme. The condition that g1(s) = s strikes us as natural, although
it is not necessary for our analysis. This condition implies that the restriction
of g to S × S coincides with g2 and is, hence, symmetric. Constructing the
aggregate in an inductive way has two advantages. First, it allows us to speak
of families of games with a variable number of players but the same strategic
structure. This will be useful to perform comparative statics with respect to
the number of players. Second, it allows to formulate the payoﬀs of the game
depending only on individual strategy and either an aggregate of all strate-
gies, or an aggregate of the strategies of the other players. Indeed, consider a
family of symmetric aggregative games {Γn}∞
n=1 with Γn ≡ (n,S,π). Deﬁne
e π : S × X → R by
e π(s,x) = π(s,g(x,s)).
Now, using (1), we can view the payoﬀs of the game Γn as a function of
individual strategy and an aggregate (namely gn−1) of the strategies of the
other players as follows.
πi(si,s−i) = π(si,g
n(si,s−i)) = e π(si,g
n−1(s−i))
In the literature, the dependence of the payoﬀ function on an aggregate of
the opponents’ strategies is exploited to simplify the analysis of best reply
correspondences (see e. g. Vives [1999]).
2.2 Super- and submodularity in aggregative games
In this section we adapt the concepts of super- and submodular games (see
e. g. Topkis [1998]) to the case of aggregative games.
Deﬁnition 3. We say that an aggregative game Γ ≡ (N,S,π) is super-
modular (resp. submodular) in individual strategy and the aggregate if π has
increasing (resp. decreasing) diﬀerences; i. e. if π(s00,x)−π(s0,x) is increasing
(resp. decreasing) in x ∈ X for all s00 > s0 ∈ S.
5If X = R and π(s,x) is continuously twice diﬀerentiable, then π has
increasing (resp. decreasing) diﬀerences if and only if
∂2π(s,x)
∂x∂s
≥ (resp. ≤ ) 0
The concept of increasing diﬀerences captures the notion of complemen-
tarity —the incentive to increase s increases with the level of the aggregate
x. Respectively, the concept of decreasing diﬀerences captures the notion of
substitutability —the incentive to increase s decreases with the level of the
aggregate x.
Deﬁnition 4. We say that an aggregative game Γ ≡ (N,S,π) is quasisu-
permodular in individual strategy and the aggregate if π satisﬁes the single-



















We say that Γ is quasisubmodular in individual strategy and the aggregate
if π satisﬁes the dual single crossing property in (s,x); i. e. if the conditions
above hold with the reversed inequalities.
The single-crossing property (SCP) is an ordinal version of complemen-
tarity weaker than increasing diﬀerences. If s00 is preferred to s0 given x = x0,
then s00 is preferred to s0 given a higher x = x00, although we cannot say
whether the incentive to replace s0 with s00 has increased. Thus, increasing
diﬀerences implies the SCP, but not vice versa. An analogous remark can be
made for the dual SCP.
2.3 Examples of aggregative games
Example 1. Cournot oligopoly. Consider an oligopolistic market for a
homogeneous good with quantity-setting ﬁrms. Let qi ∈ R+ be the quantity
supplied by ﬁrm i = 1,...,n. Inverse demand is given by a strictly decreasing
function P(·) that depends on the aggregate output level Q =
P
i qi. All ﬁrms
face the same increasing cost function C(q). The proﬁt to ﬁrm i is then given
by
πi(q) = π(qi,g
n(q)) = P (g
n(q))qi − C(qi)
with q ∈ Rn
+ and gn(q) =
Pn
j=1 qj increasing. This deﬁnes a family of
aggregative games in the sense of Deﬁnition 2, with aggregate equal to the
sum of all quantities.6
6Alternatively, we could have chosen the inverse demand function itself as a (decreasing)
aggregate. As noted above, our results could be rewritten for such aggregates.
6The Cournot game is submodular in own (qi) and total (Q) output. To
see this, let q00
i > q0
i, and note that
π(q
00








i ) − C(q
0
i))
is decreasing in Q for P decreasing.
No further assumptions are required for the Cournot oligopoly to be sub-
modular in individual strategy and the aggregate. If, alternatively, we con-
ceive the payoﬀs of this game as a function of individual strategy and an
aggregate of the opponents’ strategies, the corresponding submodularity is
obtained only under the additional assumption of decreasing marginal rev-
enues. Particular instances of the Cournot game are usually analyzed in the
literature as supermodular in own output and the opponents’ total output
through convenient changes of variable (see Amir [1996] or Vives [1999]).
Example 2. Rent-seeking. There is a rent V to be obtained—e. g. rent de-
rived from monopoly power, a prize, some commonly valued good (auction).
Players compete for this rent by investing some eﬀort or income, si ∈ R+,
i = 1,...,n. Only the player that wins the contest obtains the rent, while
all other expenditures are lost. The higher the expenditure of a player, si,
the higher the probability that i obtains the rent, given by





The parameter r models a technology that turns expenditures or eﬀorts into
probabilities of winning. If r < 1 there are decreasing returns to these eﬀorts.
If r > 1 there are increasing returns. The borderline case r = 1 corresponds
to constant returns.
In a Nash equilibrium total expenditure is always lower than V . In par-
ticular, if the number of players is n ≤ r/(r − 1), there is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium of this game with ˆ s = n−1
n2 rV (see e. g. Lockard and Tullock
(eds.) [2001]).














and r > 0.

















This, however, would not fulﬁll Deﬁnition 2.
Example 3. Tragedy of the commons. Consider the following version
of the problem of the commons. A set of agents operate a commonly owned
production process with decreasing returns to scale. Agents choose their
input contributions and total output is distributed in proportion to individual
contributions. This results in an average return game as deﬁned by Moulin
and Watts [1997]. Let si ∈ R+ denote the individual contribution of agent i =
1,...,n, and let gn(s) =
P
i si be the aggregate input. Output is produced
with a technology given by y = f(gn(s)), with f(0) = 0 and f concave.7







A Nash equilibrium of this game involves an overutilization of the technology
due to the presence of a negative externality which is not taken into account
by individual agents.8
Let A(x) = f(x)/x denote the average output. Set A(0) = limx→0 f(x)/x,
i. e. the slope of f at zero, and assume A(0) > 1. The function A is decreasing
by concavity of f. Note that payoﬀs can be written as π(s,x) = s[A(x)−1].
The game is submodular in own contribution and the aggregate. To see






is decreasing in x.
Example 4. Diamond’s search. Milgrom and Roberts [1990] present a
simpliﬁed version of Diamond’s search model (Diamond [1982]) of an econ-
omy where production results from a technology with specialized labor, mod-
elled through an individual level of eﬀort, si ∈ R+. In order to consume, each
7The production function f need not be diﬀerentiable. E. g. f(x) = ax for all x ≤ ¯ x
and f(x) = b0 + b1x for all x ≥ ¯ x, with b1 < a < 1 and b0 = (a − b1)¯ x.
8Moulin and Watts [1997] show this in a general framework where agents are endowed
with convex preferences on output share and input consumption, and both goods are
normal. The version presented here is akin to the common pool resource extraction game
in Sethi and Somanathan [2001].
8individual must ﬁrst produce a good at cost C(si), increasing with si, that
must be exchanged for another individual’s good. Success in ﬁnding a trading
partner—and thus in consumption of produced goods—depends proportion-
ally on the own eﬀort and the total level of eﬀort in the economy. The latter
is then interpreted as employment. The point was to show that there may
be multiple equilibria, i. e., multiple natural rates of unemployment. This is






j=1 sj and α > 0.








is increasing in the aggregate x.
Example 5. Minimum eﬀort. The minimum-eﬀort game can be used to
model a Stag-Hunt production game where the inputs are n diﬀerent types of
specialized labor, all of them perfect complements for the production of the
output (see e. g. Bryant [1994]). Individual level of eﬀort is denoted si ∈ R+
and production costs are linear. This can be seen as a family of aggregative




aggregate gn(s) = mini{si}, and a > b ≥ 0.






is constant in x.9
3 Evolutionary stability in a ﬁnite population
Standard evolutionary game theory considers random, pairwise contests be-
tween individuals drawn from an inﬁnite population—two individuals are
repeatedly chosen at random to play a given two-player game. In that con-
text, a strategy is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if, once adopted
by the whole population, it cannot be invaded by a small mass of mutants,
that is, individuals displaying diﬀerent behavior (see e. g. Weibull [1995]).
9This holds true for any separable payoﬀ function π(s,x) = h1(s) + h2(x).
9To apply the principle of natural selection to, say, ﬁrms in an industry, we
need a deﬁnition of an ESS for a ﬁnite population of players which “play the
ﬁeld”, that is all compete with each other simultaneously (Schaﬀer [1988]).
This will diﬀer from the analogous concept for an inﬁnite population. In a
small population with mutants coming in one at a time, the single mutant
will not face other mutants.
Let Γ ≡ (N,S,Π) be a symmetric N-player game. That is, S is the
common strategy set for all players, Π : S × SN−1 → R, and the individual
payoﬀ functions are given by πi(s) ≡ Π(si|s−i) for all s ∈ SN and i =
1,...,N, where Π(si|s−i) = Π(si|s0
−i) if s0
−i is a permutation of s−i.
Deﬁnition 5. We say that s ∈ S is an ESS of a symmetric game Γ ≡




An ESS is strict if the inequality holds strictly for all s0 6= s.
In a ﬁnite population, an ESS strategist does not maximize own payoﬀs
in general; rather, it is relative payoﬀs that are maximized—the diﬀerence
between own and opponents’ payoﬀs. A deviation to an ESS may decrease
own survival probability, but in that case it will decrease the opponents’
probability of survival even more. This is called spiteful behavior (Hamilton





Thus, an ESS corresponds to a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game
with relative payoﬀs. In general, however, a ﬁnite-population ESS does not
necessarily correspond to a Nash equilibrium of the original game in stark
contrast to the standard ESS concept for an inﬁnite population.
Allowing for the appearance of mutants in groups results in a more strin-
gent concept of stability of a ﬁnite-population ESS.
Deﬁnition 6. Let s be an ESS of a symmetric game Γ ≡ (N,S,Π). We say







for all 1 ≤ m ≤ N − 1.
Note that in a ﬁnite population of N players with m mutants, players
choosing the incumbent strategy face m mutants, while mutants face only
m − 1 other mutants, since the mutant never faces herself.
10Deﬁnition 6 diﬀers slightly from the one by Schaﬀer [1988], who calls an
ESS globally stable if it fulﬁlls the strict inequality in Deﬁnition 6 for m ≥ 2
(see Crawford [1991] and Tanaka [2000] for closely related concepts).
Both ESS and global stability constitute a stability check against a single
competing strategy. An ESS is robust against all possible mutants coming
in small fractions; i. e. in a ﬁnite population only one at a time. A globally
stable strategy is robust against all possible mutant strategies independently
of the fraction of mutants.10
ESS in an aggregative game
Let Γ ≡ (N,S,π) be a symmetric aggregative game with aggregate g. Then,





That is, s performs better than the mutant strategy s0 in the post-mutation






An ESS, s, is weakly (strictly) globally stable if, for all s0 6= s and all







Example 1. Cournot oligopoly (continued). Denote by qw the output
level corresponding to a Walrasian equilibrium, which satisﬁes
P (n · q
w)q
w − C (q
w) ≥ P (n · q
w)q − C (q)
for all q 6= qw. In words, qw maximizes proﬁts given the price. Vega-Redondo








P((n − k)q + kq
w)q − C(q) = π(q,g(q, n−k ...,q,q
w, k ...,q
w))
which implies that qw is a strictly globally stable ESS. To see this, note that
it follows from P(.) strictly decreasing that
[P (nq
w) − P ((n − k)q + kq
w)](q
w − q) < 0
10In Section 6 we will postulate a dynamic model where simultaneous mutations to
diﬀerent strategies are allowed.
11Subtracting C(q) + C(qw) and rearranging we obtain
[P ((n − k)q + kq
w)q
w − C (q
w)] − [P ((n − k)q + kq
w)q − C (q)] >
[P (nq
w)q
w − C (q
w)] − [P (nq
w)q − C (q)]
It suﬃces to notice that the right-hand side of the previous inequality is
non-negative by deﬁnition of qw.
Remark 1. In general, the output corresponding to a competitive equilib-
rium is larger than the output corresponding to a Cournot equilibrium. It
is worth noting that this fact generalizes as follows. For any aggregative
game with strictly increasing aggregate g and payoﬀ function π(s,x) strictly
decreasing in x, a globally stable ESS, s∗, will always be larger than the
strategy corresponding to a symmetric Nash equilibrium, ˜ s. For
π(˜ s,g(˜ s,..., ˜ s)) ≥ π(s
∗,g(s
∗, ˜ s,..., ˜ s)) ≥ π(˜ s,g(s
∗, ˜ s,..., ˜ s)),
but ˜ s > s∗ would imply g(s∗, ˜ s,..., ˜ s) < g(˜ s,..., ˜ s) and π(˜ s,g(s∗, ˜ s,..., ˜ s)) >
π(˜ s,g(˜ s,..., ˜ s)), a contradiction.
4 Aggregate-taking behavior
We have just seen in Example 1 that the outcome of price-taking behavior
corresponds to a ﬁnite population ESS. By price-taking behavior it is meant
that agents ignore the eﬀect of their individual decisions on the market price.
The generalization of this idea to an arbitrary aggregative game results in
the concept of aggregate-taking behavior.
Deﬁnition 7. Let Γ ≡ (N,S,π) be a symmetric aggregative game. We say






A strict ATS is an ATS which is a strict maximizer of this problem.
Example 2. Rent-seeking (continued). The ﬁrst order condition of prob-
lem (4) for this case yields
∂π(si,g(s∗,...,s∗))
∂si














12it follows that π(si,g(s∗,...,s∗)) is strictly concave in si if r < 1. Thus,
s∗ = r
n·V is a strict maximum and, hence, a strict ATS in that case. Note that
total investment is n·s∗ = r·V < V ; i. e., there is no overdissipation of rent.
The Nash equilibrium of the game, however, is given by ˆ s = n−1
n2 ·r ·V 6= s∗.
Hehenkamp et al. [2001] ﬁnd that s∗ is an ESS of this game for r ≤
1 + 1
n−1. This is a second example where ATS and ESS coincide, for a
certain range of parameters. The ESS problem in this example captures the
tradeoﬀ between increasing the relative probability of winning the prize and
the additional relative per unit investment necessary to do so, where relative
here means in comparison with the opponents. The fact that s∗ is an ESS
means that ignoring the eﬀect of individual investments on the aggregate
level of investment is a shortcut to solve that problem. In a sense, an ATS
maximizes the relative probability of winning the prize taking the cost into
account.
Existence of ATS
Existence of a solution to problem (4) is guaranteed by Kakutani’s ﬁxed
point theorem if the strategy set S is a compact, convex subset of R and the
payoﬀ function π(s,x) is continuous in (s,x) and quasiconcave in s. Here we
provide alternative conditions based on supermodularity for the existence of
an ATS.
Proposition 1. Let Γ ≡ (N,S,π) be a symmetric, quasisupermodular ag-
gregative game. If S ⊂ R is compact and π(s,x) is upper semicontinuous in
s for each x, then an ATS exists.
Proof. The result follows as an application of Lemma 1 in the Appendix to
the function F(s,t) = π(s,g(t,...,t)). The function F satisﬁes the single-
crossing property by quasisupermodularity of Γ and the fact that g is in-
creasing.
Existence of an ATS for a quasisubmodular game cannot be directly es-
tablished. For the case of a Cournot oligopoly, Amir and Lambson [2000]
observe that payoﬀ functions can be rewritten to depend only on total out-
put and the sum of the opponents’ output levels. Under mild, additional
assumptions, the game is supermodular in these two variables, a fact that
can be used to show existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria. This approach
can be generalized to show existence of Nash equilibrium in families of ag-
gregative games, for which the aggregate of the opponents’ strategies is well
deﬁned by gn−1. It can be shown by means of counterexamples, however,
that this method fails to provide an existence result for ATS.
135 ESS, ATS, and supermodularity
In Examples 1 and 2 we saw that ESS and ATS coincide at least for cer-
tain parameter ranges. We also saw that both are examples of submodular
aggregative games. In the present section, we explore the relation between
ATS and ESS in the framework of a general super- or submodular aggregative
game.
Proposition 2. Let Γ ≡ (N,S,π) be a symmetric aggregative game. Sup-
pose Γ is quasisupermodular in individual strategy and the aggregate. If
s∗ ∈ S is an ESS, then s∗ is also an ATS. If s∗ is a strict ESS, then s∗ is also
a strict ATS.
Proof. Let s∗ be an ESS. Consider a mutation to a strategy s < s∗. By





















verifying the ATS property for s.





















which contradicts that s∗ is an ESS.
The proof that strict ESS implies strict ATS follows analogously, with
strict inequalities in (6) and (7), and weak inequalities in (9) and (10).
Proposition 3. Let Γ ≡ (N,S,π) be a symmetric aggregative game. Sup-
pose Γ is quasisubmodular in individual strategy and the aggregate. If s∗ ∈ S
is an ATS, then s∗ is also an ESS and it is weakly globally stable. If s∗ is a
strict ATS, then s∗ is the unique ESS (and hence also the unique ATS) and
it is strictly globally stable.
14Proof. Let s∗ be an ATS. To check weak global stability and, in particular,
the ESS property, we consider ﬁrst m mutations to the same strategy s > s∗,





















verifying the ESS property for s.












∗)) < π(s,g(s, m ...,s,s
∗,...,s
∗)). (15)







which contradicts that s∗ is an ATS.
The proof that strict ATS implies strict global stability and, in particular
strict ESS follows analogously, with strict inequalities in (12) and (13), and
weak inequalities in (15) and (16). To see uniqueness, suppose there is a




∗, ˜ s,..., ˜ s)) > π(˜ s,g(s
∗, ˜ s,..., ˜ s)),
in contradiction with ˜ s being an ESS.
Summarizing, the last two propositions show that ESS implies ATS in
the supermodular case, and the reverse implication is true in the submodular
case.11 For instance, the Cournot oligopoly of Example 1 is submodular in
own and aggregate output. Hence, the individual output level of a Walrasian
equilibrium (by deﬁnition, an ATS) is an ESS by Proposition 3.
11If we allow for decreasing aggregates in Deﬁnition 1, we obtain the dual results, i. e.,
ESS implies ATS if π satisﬁes the dual SCP, and ATS implies ESS if π satisﬁes the SCP.
15To get an intuition for these results, consider an ATS s∗ and an arbitrary
strategy s > s∗ in the quasisubmodular case. By deﬁnition of ATS, there is no
incentive to switch from s∗ to s given the value of the aggregate. Mutations
to s will increase the value of the aggregate. Quasisubmodularity implies
that there are no gains in relative terms from playing s rather than s∗ in the
post-mutation proﬁle.
Note that our results for the submodular case are stronger than those for
supermodularity. This is due to an asymmetry in the concepts of ATS and
ESS. In particular, Proposition 3 will be more useful than Proposition 2, as
we will illustrate in examples below. Recall an ESS solves the maximization
problem (2) and an ATS solves the maximization problem (4). In general,
the latter is much easier to solve than the former. In the supermodular
case, Proposition 2 implies that solving (4) yields a necessary condition for
an ESS. In that case, suﬃcient conditions for ESS need still be checked.
In the submodular case, though, solving (4) is suﬃcient to ﬁnd an ESS by
Proposition 3. Moreover, in this case, strict ATS will always be strictly
globally stable, a fact that will have strong implications for dynamic stability
(see Section 6).
The diﬀerentiable case
Propositions 2 and 3 do not require any diﬀerentiability assumptions on the
considered aggregative game, relying only on sub- or supermodularity. For
speciﬁc examples, however, diﬀerentiability helps to establish the equivalence
of ESS and ATS (or to identify the parameter range where this equivalence
holds). Possajennikov [2003] observes that under diﬀerentiability, the ﬁrst
order conditions of problems (2) and (4) are identical. He then ﬁnds suﬃcient
conditions for (interior) ESS and ATS to coincide. These conditions can be
summarized as follows. If relative payoﬀs (the argument in problem (2))
are quasiconcave in the mutant’s strategy (s0)—and hence the second-order
condition for a global maximum of (2) is fulﬁlled—then ATS implies ESS;
conversely, if the function π (the argument in problem (4)) is quasiconcave
in individual strategy—the second-order condition for a global maximum of
(4) is fulﬁlled—then ESS implies ATS. The diﬀerence between these and our
results is illustrated in Example 2 below.
Examples
Example 2. Rent-seeking (continued). We saw that this game is submod-
ular in individual strategy and the aggregate, and that s∗ = r
n · V is a strict
ATS for 0 < r < 1. By Proposition 3, it follows that s∗ is the unique ESS.
16Hence, ATS implies ESS, and vice versa (by uniqueness). Therefore, ATS
and ESS coincide for 0 < r < 1.
In order to apply the approach in Possajennikov [2003] the second-order
conditions of both problems must be carefully examined to reach the pre-
vious conclusion. The point here is that examination of the second-order
condition for problem (2) is more cumbersome than the direct application of
Proposition 3.
For r > 1 there is no ATS, so neither Proposition 3 nor the results in
Possajennikov [2003] can be applied. Hehenkamp et al. [2001] show, however,
that s∗ is an ESS for r ≤ 1+ 1
n−1. For 1 < r < 1+ 1
n−1, s∗ is an ESS but not
an ATS.
Example 3. Tragedy of the Commons (continued). We saw that this
game is submodular in individual strategy and the aggregate. An interior
ATS is given by the condition A(ns∗) = 1.12 By Proposition 3, it follows that
every ATS is a globally stable ESS. By Remark 1, in a globally stable ESS
input contributions are larger than in a Nash equilibrium, and the tragedy
of the commons is exacerbated. The intuition is straightforward. If selﬁsh
agents act strategically, they neglect to consider the negative externality that
increasing their contribution imposes on the other agents. Under aggregate-
taking behavior, they further neglect to consider the negative eﬀect that an
increase of their input has on their own payoﬀ. This resembles the case of
a Cournot oligopoly with constant returns to scale. From the ﬁrms’ point
of view, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is strictly worse than the “eﬃcient”
collusive outcome, and the Walrasian outcome (which is an ATS) is even
worse.
Example 4. Diamond’s search (continued). We saw that this game is
supermodular in individual strategy and the aggregate. In this case, by
Proposition 2, it follows that every ESS is an ATS. If C00 > 0, an ATS is given
by the ﬁrst-order condition for problem (4), αns∗−C0(s∗) = 0. Hence, this is
also a necessary conditions for an ESS.13 As in Possajennikov [2003], here we
must check the second-order condition for problem (2). Direct computations
show that if C00 > 2α, then the condition above is also suﬃcient for ESS.
Therefore, ESS and ATS coincide for C00 > 2α, but it is easy to construct
examples (with C00 > 0 but C00 ≯ 2α) where there is no ESS but there is an
ATS.
12If S = [0,K] and A(nK) > 1, the ATS is given by s∗ = K.
13In contrast, the necessary condition for a symmetric Nash equilibrium is α(n + 1) ·
sN − C0(sN) = 0.
17Example 5. Minimum eﬀort (continued). In this case, since the aggregate
is a minimum function, the individual payoﬀ functions are not diﬀerentiable
and the analysis based on ﬁrst- and second-order conditions does not apply.
The game, though, is both super- and submodular in individual strategy and
the aggregate. By Propositions 2 and 3, every ESS is an ATS and vice versa.
Since π is decreasing in si the only ATS (hence, the only ESS) is s∗ = 0.
Note that all symmetric proﬁles (s,...,s) with s ∈ R+ are Nash equilibria.
Thus, in this case the ﬁnite-population ESS is a Nash equilibrium.
6 Stochastic stability of an ESS
Vega-Redondo [1997] considers a discrete-time dynamic model of a Cournot
oligopoly where ﬁrms choose quantities from a ﬁnite grid.14 Each period,
imperfectly informed, boundedly rational ﬁrms imitate the output level of
any ﬁrm with highest proﬁts in the previous period. Occasionally, with an
exogenous probability ε > 0, ﬁrms experiment with an arbitrary output level.
The prediction of the model is that, for small ε, the system spends most of
the time at the state where all ﬁrms produce the output corresponding to
the Walrasian equilibrium—strict ATS (hence, strictly globally stable ESS)
of the Cournot game with strictly decreasing demand. Formally, this state
is stochastically stable.15 Using recent results on stochastic stability from
Ellison [2000], it is easy to show that the former conclusion generalizes to
any strictly globally stable ESS. This result is of independent interest and
can be stated for symmetric games in general, and not only for aggregative
games. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst result on dynamic stability of a
ﬁnite-population ESS.
Let Γ ≡ (N,S,Π) be any symmetric game with ﬁnite S. Assume play-
ers choose strategies from S in discrete time t = 0,1,... according to the
following two rules:
(i) Imitation: Each period t ≥ 1, players mimic one of the strategies that
gave highest payoﬀs in the previous period.
(ii) Experimentation: With independent probability ε > 0, players ignore
the prescription of imitation, and choose a strategy from S according
to a probability distribution with full support.
14This requirement is for tractability. For a discussion of this model with a continuum
of strategies see K.R.Schenk-Hopp´ e [2000].
15A state is stochastically stable if it is in the support of the limit invariant distribution
of the process as ε → 0.
18Proposition 4. Let Γ ≡ (N,S,Π) be a symmetric N-player game with ﬁnite
S. Let s∗ be a strictly globally stable ESS. Then, the proﬁle (s∗,...,s∗) is
the unique stochastically stable state of the imitation dynamics with exper-
imentation.
Proof. s∗ is a strictly globally stable ESS; i. e., it is resistant to any number
of simultaneous experiments (mutations) with the same strategy. Taking
m = 1 and m = N − 1 in Deﬁnition 6, we obtain that
(a) starting at s∗, an experimenter choosing any other s 6= s∗ performs
strictly worse, and
(b) starting at any s 6= s∗, an experimenter with s∗ performs strictly better.
Ellison [2000, Theorem 1] provides the following result for stochastic sta-
bility of a state ω. Let the radius of the state, R(ω), be the minimum number
of experiments necessary to leave ω. Let the coradius of the state, CR(ω), be
the maximum number of experiments necessary to reach ω from any other
state. If R(ω) > CR(ω), then ω is the only stochastically stable state.
For our particular imitation dynamics with experimentation, (a) above
implies that R(s∗,...,s∗) > 1 and CR(ω) > 1 for any other state. By
(b), CR(s∗,...,s∗) = 1 and R(ω) = 1 for any other state. In particular,
R(s∗,...,s∗) > CR(s∗,...,s∗), implying that (s∗,...,s∗) is the only stochas-
tically stable state.16 Intuitively, this state is harder to destabilize through
experimentation than any other state.
Corollary 1. Let Γ ≡ (N,S,π) be a quasisubmodular aggregative game with
ﬁnite S. Let s∗ be a strict ATS. Then the proﬁle (s∗,...,s∗) is the unique
stochastically stable state of the imitation dynamics with experimentation.
Corollary 1 follows from Propositions 3 and 4. It provides a link between
the ATS concept in submodular aggregative games and the long-run outcome
of dynamical models based on imitative behavior. Applied to a Cournot oli-
gopoly as in Example 1, it yields the result in Vega-Redondo [1997]. Applied
to a rent-seeking game as in Example 2, it implies stochastic stability of the
proﬁle where each player invests s∗ = r
n ·V when r < 1. This can be seen as
an eﬃcient outcome since it avoids overdissipation of rent.
16Moreover, the expected waiting time until this state is ﬁrst reached is of order ε−1.
In particular, the order of convergence is independent of population size.
197 Conclusions
The present work deals with the class of (generalized) symmetric aggregative
games, whose payoﬀ function may be written to depend only on individual
strategy and an aggregate of all strategies. If players were negligible, in a
Nash equilibrium of such games their behavior would correspond to opti-
mization given the value of the aggregate. If players are not negligible, this
kind of aggregate-taking behavior is still well deﬁned, although it does not
correspond to rational behavior. We refer to an optimal aggregate-taking
strategy (ATS) as an optimizing strategy given the value of the aggregate,
when all players choose that strategy. This is a generalization of the concept
of competitive equilibrium.
We consider two dual cases. Under submodularity of the payoﬀ function,
which includes the case of Cournot oligopoly, an ATS satisﬁes an evolutionary
stability criterion. Speciﬁcally, any deviation from an ATS in that case leaves
the deviator worse oﬀ in relative terms. A strategy verifying this property is
called a ﬁnite-population ESS. Under supermodularity of the payoﬀ function,
the converse result obtains; i. e. aggregate-taking behavior is a necessary
condition for evolutionary stability.
Moreover, in the submodular case, we show that a strict ATS is also the
long-run outcome of a learning dynamics based on imitation and experimen-
tation. This provides dynamic foundation for aggregate-taking behavior in
such settings.
In other words, in the supermodular case we ﬁnd that ATS is a necessary
condition for ESS, while in the submodular case it is a suﬃcient condition for
globally stable ESS. In the latter case, this provides a shortcut for the compu-
tation of an ESS and the long-run outcomes of imitative learning dynamics.
Of course, these ﬁndings are useful provided an ATS exists. Existence is
guaranteed if the payoﬀ function of the game is quasiconcave in individual
strategy. It turns out that this requirement is easier to verify than the condi-
tions required to ﬁnd an ESS directly, due to the complexity of the objective
function of the associated optimization problem.
Appendix
We say that F : R2 → R satisﬁes the single-crossing property in (s,x) ∈ R2



















20The following result is an application of well known lattice programming
results. We refer the reader to Topkis [1998] for further details.
Lemma 1. Let S ⊂ R be compact. Suppose F : R2 → R satisﬁes the single-
crossing property and F(s,x) is upper semicontinuous in s for each value of






Proof. Upper-semicontinuity of F and compactness of S guarantee that
argmaxs∈S F(s,x) is non-empty for each x. By Topkis [1998, Theorem 2.8.6]
(due to Milgrom and Shannon [1994]) and Topkis [1998, Corollary 2.7.1 and
Theorem 2.4.3] the maximum and minimum selections of argmaxs∈S F(s,x)
are increasing. By Tarski’s ﬁxed point theorem (see e. g. Topkis [1998, Corol-
lary 2.5.1]) these selections have a ﬁxed point.
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